A trusted delivery path carried modified project content
Optimizely told BleepingComputer that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow to add JavaScript to some customer projects. Report URI located injections in Project JavaScript, a field whose contents become part of the snippets that customers load into webpages. A modified file could therefore arrive from the familiar Optimizely domain with a valid certificate. The researchers distinguish this from CDN cache poisoning: the significant change was malicious project content delivered through a path the receiving website already trusted.
The investigation measures scripts and organizations, not victims
Report URI reported 188 infected JavaScript files associated with 178 organizations after examining 1,611 snippets. BleepingComputer separately confirmed loading or attempted loading of the malicious code on multiple sites through archived scans. Those figures describe the inspected sample and identified injections. They do not count compromised devices or people who lost money. A brand appearing in the list also does not establish that its own servers were breached: third-party JavaScript can act inside a visitor’s browser without an attacker obtaining that separate infrastructure access.
Observed capabilities do not establish universal exploitation
The analysis describes cryptocurrency-address replacement, payment-card skimming, accessible-cookie theft, page screenshots and routing iPhone or iPad users toward the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. These are capabilities identified in the payload, rather than proof that each technique succeeded against every visitor. Report URI also observed multiple loader forms, including encoded addresses and an embedded copy of the code. At publication, the overall number of exposed visitors remained unknown. Merely opening an affected page does not establish the particular information stolen from an individual session.
Containment statements and snapshots have a defined scope
In its statement to BleepingComputer, Optimizely said it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. It also said customers had been notified and the investigation was continuing. Report URI’s snapshot at 21:52 UTC on November 16 found malicious code in one of the previously identified 188 files. That is a time-specific observation, rather than proof of complete cleanup everywhere. For defenders, the incident highlights the importance of checking third-party dependency behavior even when its delivery domain has long been trusted.

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